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 ABSTRACT: Drawing on Victor Turner’s emphasis on the importance of symbols 
and his analyses of liminality together with Wilhelm Dilthey’s explanations of 
experience, and considering the mimetic theory of René Girard, this article focuses 
on the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran to explore Shia religion, particularly its 
symbols, before and after the 1979 revolution in Iran, where religion and politics 
influence each other. It demonstrates how a Shia ritual performance such as 
Ta’ziyeh and its symbols played key roles in mobilising crowds for the revolution, 
and how these symbols began to dominate political life, pervade all levels of 
society, and enable political actors and revolutionary clerics to legitimise their 
actions and violence after the revolution. In other words, it investigates how, under 
such liminal condition, Shia Muslims means of commemorating the past shapes 
their present and future. 
   
KEYWORDS: religion, revolution, Ta’ziyeh, liminality, symbols, Iran, culture, 
imitation, sacrifice, ritual 
 
Amin SHARIFI ISALOO has a PhD in Sociology and he teaches sociology in the 
Department of Sociology at University College Cork. He is the author of the book 
Power, Legitimacy and the Public Sphere: The Iranian Ta’ziyeh Theatre Ritual 
(Routledge, 2017). His fields of interest include politics, religion and culture, 
focusing on sociological and anthropological interpretations of symbols, images 
and ritual performances. 
The Journal of the Irish Society for the Academic Study of Religions 6 








Modernisation policies of the Shah (King) of Iran in 1950s resulted in a 
widespread split between his secularised supporters and vocal minority of 
Shia clerics in Iran. The gap between them grew as the Shah and his circle 
extended their authority and influence over areas previously was 
dominated by the clerics. The Shah hoped that Western-oriented reforms 
would encourage people to start thinking in secular terms, which inherently 
challenge the traditional clerics, but he failed to foresee that some Shia 
clerics can utilise religious symbols and rhetoric to question his authority 
and modernisation policies.  
At the same time, the writings of Islamic intellectuals, such as Sayyid 
Qutb (1950s-1960s) and activities of the Ikhwan ul Muslim (Muslim 
Brotherhood) in Egypt, helped to develop the idea that a powerful and 
strong Islamic faith and its rules should constitute the dominant principles 
of social life and politics. Indeed, their original concept and aim, creating an 
Islamic state with Sharia canons, principles and laws, was brought into 
existence by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran (Heywood 2007, 66). 
In 1964, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was exiled from Iran for his 
criticism of the shah, but he could mobilise a powerful force in Iran against 
the Shah, which led to the 1979 revolution. Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran 
has been ruled by an Islamic regime led by the revolutionary clerics. At the 
top of Iran’s power structure presently is the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, 
who succeeded Ruhollah Khomeini. Iran has an intertwined political 
system operating under the framework of Islamic (Shia) theocracy. The 
Supreme Leader holds the ultimate authority, and publicly elected (such as 
the president, the parliament and the Assembly of Experts) and unelected 
institutions (such as the Supreme Leader, the Head of Judiciary and the 
Expediency Council) influence each other in the power structure.  
 During the revolution Shia symbols were utilised as much as possible 
to gather protesters against the Shah (King). Anthropologists, such as 
Turner (1967; 1982) and Schneider (1977), put a great emphasise on symbols 
and their meanings. Alternatively, a system of symbols may be understood 
as defining the culture of a society. In other words, the culture is created, 
developed and maintained by a system of symbols. In Turner’s (1967) 
words, it is a forest of symbols, and in Schneider’s (1977) account, it is a 
system of symbols and meanings. In terms of religious performances such 
as Ta’ziyeh, these symbols and their meanings are used to make crowds 
unify, create, laugh, cry, sacrifice, violate rules and hierarchy, destroy, fight, 
and lastly kill or be killed.   
 Ta’ziyeh create a powerful emotion. Therefore, through the study of 
Ta’ziyeh as a liminal event and performance, as well as examining the 1979 
Revolution as a liminal period, this paper aims to explore how the symbols 
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of Shia ritual performances were employed during the Revolution to create 
an emotional reaction and to mobilise Shia Muslims in Iran for a pre-
planned aim.  
 
 
Liminality and Experience 
 
Turner (1988, 75) describes ritual as the performance of a complex sequence 
of symbolic acts, revealing major classifications, categories, and 
contradictions of cultural processes. It is a dramatic endeavour to bring a 
certain part of life into systematic control, to structure cultural and historical 
processes (ibid, 190). He cites Moore and Myerhoff’s ‘Secular Ritual’ (1977) 
to emphasise that any collective ritual is an organized event and has some 
order. ‘It may contain within it moments of, or elements of chaos and 
spontaneity, but these are in prescribed times and places’ (Myerhoff and 
Moore 1977, 7). Any collective ritual has a social message and meaning, 
which is the ‘collective dimension’ of ritual. In Turner’s (1988, 154) words,  
 
meaning is assigned verbally through speech and nonverbally 
through ritual and ceremonial action and is often stored in symbols 
which become indexical counters in subsequent situational 
contexts.  
 
One of the characters of collective ritual that Myerhoff (1977) listed is 
evocative presentational style of ‘staging’, which ‘produce at least an 
attentive state of mind’ (Myerhoff and Moore 1977, 7). The staging and 
utilising of symbols in ritual during the liminal period is the central theme 
of this paper. As Myerhoff and Moore (1977, 8) assert, ritual may be a 
framework that generates creativity in individuals to produce a 
concentration so extreme that there is a loss of self-consciousness and a 
feeling ‘flow’, whether through liminal experiences of visions or trances, or 
through highly structured, rule bounded activities.  
 Turner introduced the idea of the multivocality of ritual and their 
bipolar character to indicate that one symbol may stand for many things 
(Turner 1967, 50). However, his work on liminality and communitas, is 
considered the most important contribution that he made to the field of 
anthropology. Van Gennep preceded him, in developing the term ‘liminal’ 
to describe the transition stage in rites of passages, ‘but he never followed 
up the implications of his discovery of the liminal’ (Turner 1985, 159). 
Turner took this up and developed the concept of liminality seeing it as a 
crucial component of ritual and symbolic experience. Defining liminality as 
the condition of being between a status sequence, Turner argues ‘liminars’, 
who are undergoing transition, ‘are neither here nor there; they curve 
betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, 
convention, and ceremonial’ (ibid). He understood that the previous 
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models of anthropological investigation were inadequate, and so he 
employed this concept of liminality, and followed Wilhelm Dilthey, who 
argued that the essential basis for human knowledge was the lived 
experience of human beings, to analyse ‘ritual performance’, social dramas’ 
and ‘cultural artefacts’. Turner (1985: 201) argues that the major genres of 
cultural performance and narration originate in, and continue to draw 
meaning and force from, social drama. He uses the word ‘force’ in the 
Diltheyan sense, meaning  
 
the influence which any experience has in determining what other 
experiences shall succeed it. Thus, a memory has force insofar as it 
affects our present experience and actions (ibid).  
 
Drawing on Dilthey’s concept of experience, Turner claims that cultural 
performances and the perception of ‘cultural artefacts’ are entities of 
experience that bring out what is normally sealed up or inaccessible (Turner 
1985).  In other words, ‘ritual’, ‘social dramas’ and ‘cultural artefacts’ can be 
explained by an anthropology of ‘experience’, through exploring the 
symbolic and emotive impact of the structures of society rather than 
focusing on the structures. In this way, major studies should particularly be 
devoted to circumstances between the structures, which are, in fact, 
‘liminality’. ‘Liminality is a temporal interface whose properties partially 
invert those of the already consolidated order which constitutes any specific 
cultural “cosmos”‘ (Turner 1982, 41-42). Consequently, rituals are full of 
meaningful symbols, which deal with the vital values of a group, 
community or society and are transformative in terms of behaviour and 
attitudes. Thus, to understand a cultural and religious performance, it is 
necessary to be aware of the symbols and their shared understanding in 
terms of linguistics.  
 In a liminal time or/and place, there is a sort of break in the 
structures and rules, which bear a resemblance to periods of heightened 
emotion and experience. Thus, liminality is inconsistent with ordinary day-
to-day life. If this breaks in time and space becomes unlimited, then, 
according to Szakolczai (2000), a permanent liminality occurs, amounting 
to continually living in uncertainty, such as in a period of prolonged crisis. 
This concept enables us to perceive the way in which uncertainty can 
emerge and helps us to find answers to questions such as; why and how 
such liminal periods can be used and even artificially provoked? 
(Szakolczai 2013). Thus, the transition stage of the rites of passage and the 
concept of ‘liminality’ introduced by van Gennep (1960) and Turner (1967; 
1982) respectively and the concept of ‘permanent liminality’ developed by 
Szakolczai enables us to understand how symbols and images of ritual 
performances, which is an experience of past, can be utilised during liminal 
periods, such as a revolution, to mobilise crowds and even to manipulate 
them. 
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 The ‘force’ of a social drama and collective ritual is made up of an 
experience or sequence of experiences  
 
which significantly influences the form and function of cultural 
performative genres. Such genres partly ‘imitate’ (by mimesis), the 
processual form of the social drama, and they partly, through 
reflection, assign ‘meaning’ to it (Turner 1985, 201).  
 
Consequently, during liminal periods (such as crisis and revolutions) 
mimesis and the political actors can activate this force through utilising 




Imitation and Sacrifice 
 
In ‘Violence and the Sacred’, Girard (1977, 315) notes that the importance of 
the relationship between theatre and religion has been little discussed by 
scholars. According to Girard’s mimetic theory, human beings imitate each 
other, as mimetic creatures, and this imitation ultimately gives rise to 
rivalries and violent conflicts, which have historically ended through a 
scapegoat mechanism. During a revolution, this mimetic effect can escalate 
uncontrollably, with crowd behaviour coming to dominate, risking in 
particular an escalation of violence. In crowd culture and behaviour, people 
reproduce each other’s behaviour and follow each other’s desires, therefore,  
 
beyond a certain threshold, perhaps simply beyond a certain size 
population, human groups cannot restore peace through 
dominance patterns after conflict breaks out. Brute power and 
intimidation can only carry so far (Johnsen 2012, 575).  
 
Girard gives the name ‘deviated transcendency’ to the constant parallel that 
novelists construct between this mechanism of mimetic desire and religious 
experience. Taking the title ‘men become Gods in the eyes of each other’ 
from Dostoyevsky, Girard argued that in the modern world, humans 
sacrifice themselves to each other (ibid, 577). The target is to reunite the 
community, but this cannot be done through fighting factions. Thus, the 
highly paradoxical idea of creating an enemy remains the only solution. 
This means, finding or designing an individual, a group, a system, a nation 
and a state as scapegoat, and unifying the community against this new 
target. Accordingly, the logic of sacrifice follows the mechanism inherent in 
mimetic behaviour. 
 Arguing that blood sacrifice is at the origin of every archaic society, 
Girard (1977) highlights the double character of sacrifice: it is the most 
sacred of things and it is considered as something almost criminal. This led 
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Hubert and Mauss (1899) to come up with idea of the sacred character of 
the victim. They argue that sacrifice is the origin of religion, but the origin 
of sacrifice is a question they were not able to even pose.  
 Girard (1966) uncovers the real functions of sacrifice through his 
analysis of ritual, myths (both classical and ethnological), and tragedies 
(both classical Greek and Shakespearian). He comes to the idea that sacrifice 
does fulfil a real function, even a central one: this is the prevention of 
violence in societies lacking a judicial system. In his view, the problem is 
violence, the escalation of a mimetic conflict within the community and the 
solution is the exteriorisation of violence by the designation of a single 
individual as a sacrificial victim. This mechanism is ‘the source of rituals’ 
and ‘the origin of culture’. In this way, Girard (1966) distinguishes Biblical 
story from myths, arguing that in myths victims (who are collectively 
executed), are presented as monstrous criminals, lawbreakers and 
wrongdoers that deserve to be punished. However, in the Bible, it is the 
opposite, with victims presented as innocent that are unfairly persecuted 
and punished. In comparison to Islam, in Christianity the dominant figure 
is the innocent victim, but the dominant figure of Islam is the warrior. In 
Shia Islam these two are mixed, the dominant figure is both the innocent 
victim and the warrior. Shia Muslims believe that Hussein sacrificed 
himself to redeem humanity, just as Christ did, but Hussein fought against 
oppressor in a liminal time and place until he and his companions were 
killed. This is visibly demonstrated in Ta’ziyeh performance, particularly 
when Imam Hussein confronts the Yazid’s army with his seventy-two 
followers and scarifies himself and them.     
 
 
Ta’ziyeh Drama   
 
Ta’ziyeh, which literally translates as mourning, is a religious ritual play 
and the theatrical expression based on the battle of Karbala and marked as 
the day of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom. It is performed annually on the 
tenth day of Muharram. In this day, which is known as Ashura, Shia 
Muslims commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein and his followers. 
It is a drama, which is conveyed predominantly through music and 
dramatic narration (Homayuni 1989) to demonstrate how Hussein and his 
admirers were killed by Yazid and his army in the 7th century. Chelkowski 
(1979; 2005) argues that it is a dramatic form of commemoration the Shia 
Muslims in Persia have created, in order to immortalise the tragedy of 
Hussein, and thus it is comparable to the Christian passion play. One of the 
reasons that it seems to be similar to the Christian Passion play is that Imam 
Hussein’s character in Ta’ziyeh is portrayed as the innocent victim. The 
common themes in this dramatic narration include the heroic tales of 
‘resistance against the evil’, and ‘sacrifice’.  
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 According to Ibn Kathir, Ta’ziyeh appeared in the reign of Mu’izz al-
Dawla, the King of the Buyid dynasty, in 963 AD (Mirrazavi 2011). 
Subsequently, in 1501, when the Safavid dynasty was established in Iran 
and the Shi’ism of the Twelvers was adopted as the official sect, the Safavid 
Kings were interested in theatre as a tool to propagate Shi’ism (ibid). 
Ta’ziyeh dramas are performed outdoors, at crossroads and other public 
places where substantial audiences and spectators can be gathered. It also 
takes place in the courtyards of inns, private homes, and places called 
‘Tekiyeh’ or ‘Husseiniyeh’, which are constructed by groups of people for 
Muharram’s mourning. The main performance space is simple, blunt and 
curtain-less. Characteristically, the empty stage in Ta’ziyeh represents the 
uninhabited and deserted plain of Karbala. Both symbolic and non-
symbolic props can be witnessed on stage: a basin of water represents the 
Euphrates River, green or black flags are marked with the name of 
Imam/Ya Hussein or Ya Abolfazle/Ya Abbas or other family members of 
Hussein taken in the Karbala tragedy, while a little tent (khimmeh), and a 
branch of a tree represents a palm grove, and things such as chairs, tables 
and musical instruments are examples of non-symbolic props. 
Actors/actresses who are identified with green attire and emblems 
represent Hussein and his followers, while actors displaying red dress and 
insignia play the parts of Yazid’s officers and soldiers. Thus, in Shia religion 
red dress symbolises blood, oppression and negativity. By contrast, the 
green colour is a symbol of the garden paradise and goodness. 
 By performing Ta’ziyeh, they magnify and strengthen the memory 
of the lives of the heroes of Karbala and fill gaps with details that may or 
may not seem probable (Chelkowski 2005). Therefore, as in Turner’s (1982) 
sense of the word, Ta’ziyeh is a ritual performance of a liminal event that is 
timeless and space-less as the stage is an empty place that is neither Karbala 
nor a real current place. It is a liminal performance for a liminal event that 
happened in the past. In other words, it is between real and imaginary 
world. Even, the actors’ clothes, tools, recitation are from neither the Imam 
Hussein era nor this period. For example, while both audiences and 
performers commemorating Imam Hussein and his family, who are related 
to Prophet Mohammad and subsequently to the divine, they practice self-
flagellation and sacrifice during and at the end of Ta’ziyeh.  
 
 
The Origin of Ta’ziyeh 
 
Despite religious theatrics being embedded in the inception of Ta’ziyeh, it 
also encompassed other forms of folklore. In this way, Ta’ziyeh absorbed 
and could illustrate entertaining characteristics.  
At the root of Ta’ziyeh, ancient Persian ceremonies and rituals such 
as Sogehe Siavash (a sacred dramatic mourning ritual) became recognisable 
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and visible (Yarshater 1979, 93). In Farsi language, the word ‘Sogehe’ means 
sorrow, mourning and grief. While Siavash is a Persian ancient 
mythological hero, whose destiny was marked by tragedy and became a 
symbol of innocence in Persian literature. Indeed, he is a major figure in 
Ferdowsi’s great national epic of Persia ‘The Shahnameh’ (Davis 2006). 
Siavash was a Persian Prince from the earliest days of the Persian Empire 
and was a son of Kay Kavus who reigned as King. After being exiled to 
Turan, he was killed innocently by the order of the Turanian King Afrasiab. 
Siavash’s death is still commemorated in some areas, such as Shiraz, on a 
day called Siavashun. Undoubtedly, there is still considerable interest in 
viewing the performance of Sivash’s tragedy in Persian theatre, and 
acknowledging its similarity to a Ta’ziyeh performance. Thus, Ta’ziyeh 
performance is the experience of thousands of years, which transformed 
gradually from mourning of Siavash to mourning of Imam Hussein after 
the Muslim conquest of the Persian Empire.  
 
 
The Islamic Revolution and Shia Ritual Symbols 
 
Historically, images and symbols of Shia Islam have been used since the 
Safavid dynasty to unify Iranians for war against external enemies, and 
additionally for propaganda, to bolster the state’s powers. The 
revolutionary clerics also used their knowledge of Iranian-specific culture 
including religious habits, customs, thoughts and language to employ 
Ta’ziyeh images and symbols effectively to gather crowd for the 1979 
revolution. They used religious narratives and cultural habits as a political 
weapon to form and control people and to mobilise crowds in Iranian 
society. Consequently, people imitated each other’s desires and then the 
crowds consciously or unconsciously harmed and sacrificed themselves to 
benefit the revolutionary clerics.  
 During the revolution, the revolutionary clerics formed the public 
sphere by creating and using Ta’ziyeh images and symbols via different 
types of instruments, such as posters, wall paints, mottos, slogans, 
performances, films, flags, music, speeches and sermons. In every means, 
the goriz (relating a current event to a past event) technique of Iranian 
theatre and improvised performance were employed to link Shah’s act to 
Yazid’s (the enemy of Imam Hussein) act in Karbala.  
 Before the revolution, Khomeini whose job, as a leading cleric, was to 
interpret or explain Islamic law and canons to his followers started to 
question the legitimacy of the Shah. When the Shah’s authorities attacked a 
madrasa (Shia’s theological school for clerics) seminary at Qom city on 
March 22, 1963, they arrested and beat some of tollabs to death, ‘Khomeini 
used the annual remembrance of Hussein martyrdom at Karbala as an 
occasion to deliver a blistering attack on the Shah’ (January 2008, 26). His 
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rhetorical speech using the symbols and narratives of the Muharram, 
especially Ta’ziyeh in Ashura, presented a serious challenge to Shah’s 
authority.  
 Khomeini was not the first person to use the symbols, images and 
narratives of Ta’ziyeh to protest. Similar strategies were used during the 
1906 Constitutional Revolution by clerics (Poulson 2005: 213) and before 
that in the 1890 Tobacco Protest by Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi. 
Khomeini used the assault on the tollabs’ madrasa as a focal point in his 
speeches and related it professionally to the martyrdom of Imam Hussein 
in Ashura. The following Khomeini speech, given in Fayziya Madrasa, Qom 
city, on June 3, 1963 (Khurdad 13, 1342 (AHS)/Muharram 10, 1383 (AH), 
the day of Ashura, clearly illustrates his rhetorical technique which used 
Ashura symbols and narratives to evoke the emotions of the crowd: 
 
It is now the afternoon of Ashura. Sometimes when I recall the 
events of Ashura, a question occurs to me: if the Umayyads and the 
regime of Yazid ibn Mu’awiya wished to make war against 
Hussein, why did they commit such savage and inhuman crimes 
against the defenceless women and innocent children? What was 
the offense of the women and children? It seems to me the 
Umayyads had a far more basic aim: they were opposed to the very 
existence of the family of the Prophet. They did not wish the 
Hashim to exist and their goal was to root out this “Godly tree”. 
A similar question occurs to me now. If the tyrannical regime of Iran 
simply wished to wage war on marja, to oppose the Ulama, what 
business did it have tearing the Qur’an to shreds on the day it 
attacked the Fayziya Madrasa? Indeed, what business did it have 
with the madrasa or with its students, like the eighteen-year-old 
seyyed who was killed? [...] we come to the conclusion that this 
regime also has a more basic aim: they are fundamentally opposed 
to Islam itself and the existence of the religious class. They do not 
wish this institution to exist; they do not wish any of us to exist, the 
great and small alike (Algar 1981, 177; Poulson 2005, 214- 15). 
 
Khomeini used the powerful goriz technique in his speech, in order to relate 
two different events that occurred in past and present times. He likened the 
Shah to Yazid, who was the enemy of Iman Hussein. This speech was a 
direct challenge to the Shah and led the crowds in Qom to protest. As a 
result, Khomeini was arrested the next morning, but pro-Khomeini crowds 
gathered in Tehran, clashing with the authorities in support of him. 
Consequently, Khomeini was released, but was expelled on November 4, 
1964 from Iran (January 2008, 27) to Turkey, from where he made his way 
to Shia’s religious city, Najaf, in Iraq. From Najaf and later from Neauphle-
le-Château in a suburb of Paris, he united various political and religious 
groups with different ideologies and agendas (Keddie 1981; January 2008). 
In fact, they were agreed that justice is not delivered to the people by the 
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Shah; that one’s freedom of speech or freedom of press was being oppressed 
by the authorities; and that inequality, poverty and a loss of values resulted 
from the westernisation of the country by the Mohammad Reza Shah and 
his father; whilst political activities were being repressed by the SAVAK 
(the secret police). 
 While in exile in Iraq, Khomeini spoke directly regarding these issues, 
by regularly using well-known images and symbols related to Ta’ziyeh. For 
example, he likened the clergy to Imam Hussein in Karbala fighting against 
tyranny and injustice (January 2008, 34). Khomeini’s tapes were secretly 
spread to every part of Iran through his followers and physically through a 
network of mosques. Although he was speaking as a poorly educated 
person, with strong Farsi accent and with wrong pronunciations, he was 
using simple words, sentences and Shia symbols that everyone could 
understand. Indeed, his understanding and knowledge of language and 
culture enabled him to use the rhetoric symbols which were powerful tools 
with an immediate impact on listeners. Powerfully, on many occasions 
audiences were left crying out loud and beating their chests and heads 
softly with their hands while listening to Khomeini’s rhetoric, as they do in 
annual Ta’ziyeh performance. This led some journalists, academics and 
social scientists to identify Khomeini as  a charismatic leader. According to 
Weber, Charisma is ‘the gift of grace’ (Weber 1978: 216), implying 
 
 a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which 
[one] is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities (ibid: 241).  
 
Some social scientists such as Arjomand (2009) applied this definition and 
the term routinisation to explain Khomeini’s charismatic authority during 
and after the revolution. The application of the term ‘charismatic’ to 
political leaders like Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and the revolutionary clerics 
in Iran, creates more confusion than clarity. In order to discriminate 
between various types of political and religious leaders, charisma should be 
complemented and contrasted with the figure of the ‘trickster’, (Radin 1957, 
Szakolczai 2006). This problem becomes especially serious when combined 
with another shortcoming. Weber (1978) assumes that crisis situations 
calling for charismatic action are derived from external threats, when there 
is clear consensus about the desirable outcome. However, the model does 
not work for internal dissolutions of order, when the entire community is 
divided, and when furthermore the opportunities for divisive, demagogic, 
‘trickster’-type political actors and religious leaders  are particularly ripe 
(see Szakolczai 2006). Here it should be complemented with works like 
Girard’s theoretisation of the ‘sacrificial crisis’ and the ‘scapegoat 
mechanism (Girard 1989; Szakolczai 2003). 
 




Political Shai and the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
 
On December 2, 1978, at the beginning of Muharram, the Shah ordered 
curfews at specified times, but instead millions of the population crowded 
into the streets, chanting, ‘God is great - Khomeini is our leader’ (January 
2008, 42). Leading from Paris, Khomeini was able to mobilise a massive 
crowd to demonstrate against the Shah in Iran on December 11, 1978. This 
day was the holy day, commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. 
‘Traditionally, religious leaders stimulated passions through public 
narration (rowzeh-khani) and re-enactment (Ta’ziyeh) of Hussein’s 
martyrdom’ (Kurzman 2004, 122). Therefore, Ashura was the best day for 
gathering and connecting crowds, for both the commemoration of 
Hussein’s and his followers’ suffering, sacrifice, wounds and martyrdom, 
as well as for the remembrance of Black Friday’s martyrs in Zhaleh Square 
on September 8, 1978 (17 Shahrivar, 1357). Zhaleh Square was called 
Martyrs Square (Maydan-e Shohada) after the revolution, as it is a 
significant place where protesters were massacred by Shah’s authorities. To 
honour this memory, shortly after the massacre, artists and writers started 
to create portraits and describe martyrs of the Zhaleh Square. For instance, 
Mohammad Reza Shajarian sang the piece ‘Zhaleh Khun Shod’ (Zhaleh 
became bloody), while images of the square were painted illustrating the 
blood of the martyrs with roses on it (during and after the revolution these 
images were on every wall). Hussein Alizadeh set Siavash Kasraie’s poem 
about the event to music, while some film makers presented a documentary 
of the event, such as Shahed Azad Soltani’s documentary in 1980 called 
‘Rooz-e Khoda’ (Day of God). The image of blood was everywhere and 
Khomeini and his followers were constantly linking the Zhaleh Square 
massacre to the Karbala tragedy and sacrifice of Imam Hussein and his 
companions. 
 As a result, the crowds were easy to mobilise. The whole country, from 
small villages to large cities, had risen up to march against the Shah. This 
demonstration sent a clear message to the Shah. Subsequently, the Shah 
tried to introduce a new democratic government headed by Bakhtiar. 
However, the crowds rejected his effort and accepted Khomeini’s 
leadership. Now, crowds were calling the Shah ‘Yazid’ and Khomeini 
‘Imam’. The title ‘Imam’ was a reference to the twelfth (Hidden) Imam 
Mahdi, who was born in 869. Shia Muslims (Twelvers) believe that he never 
died, only went into hiding, and will return as a messiah with Jesus to bring 
peace to the world. His ancestor is Imam Hussein followed by Hussein’s 
father Ali and his grandfather Prophet Mohammad. 
Consequently, the Shah was forced to leave Iran on January 16, 1979 
and following that on February 1, 1979, Khomeini flew from Paris to Tehran 
to directly lead the revolution, and on February 11, 1979, the final victory 
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over the American-backed Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and his 
government, was announced and celebrated (Keddie 1981, 238-9). 
After the 1979 Revolution, Khomeini, under the concept of velayat-e 
faqih (guardianship of the Jurist), transformed the Iranian religious and 
political settings and made Shia Islam an inseparable element of political 
structure. In his speeches, Khomeini condemned democratisation, 
westernisation, modernisation (similar to the West), capitalism, and 
communism. In contrast to the Pahlavi dynasty, he tried to Islamise all 
institutions and organisations. He even closed down all universities in 
Spring 1980, and nominated Abdolkarim Soroush and others as members 
of Shoray-e Englab-e Farhangi (Advisory Council on Cultural Revolution) for 
Islamising universities. 
Soroush played a role in the victory of the 1979 Revolution and 
engaged actively in forming and establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
which was Khomeini’s desire in his book ‘Islamic Government’ (1970). He is 
now tracking Sufism and believes that Khomeini never reformed Islam as a 
group of doctrine, but he tried only to empower Islamic identity (Soroush 
2010). Calling this ‘political Islam’ and criticising it, he conceptualises 
religious democracy and proposes an ‘Islamic democracy’ (Soroush 2000). 
The debate on ‘Islamic democracy’ is beyond the scope of this article, but it 
is necessary to highlight that there are two significant issues with these 
analyses of Soroush. First, he generalises Khomeini’s reform, disregarding 
that Khomeini’s reform did not empower Islamic identity, but only Shia 
identity. Second, he does not explain why he categorises Khomeini’s 
‘Islamic government’ or reform as ‘political Islam’, but he exempts his own 
proposed ‘Islamic democratic government’ from this category. 
A brief outline of Sufism in Iran is necessary due to Sufis responses 
either to modernity (or to the secular modernism) and to the 1979 
Revolution. Sufism is Islamic mysticism, which is an aspect or dimension of 
Islam. In Lewisohn’s (1999, xv) words, it is ‘principally a school of the Unity 
of Being (wahdat-e wujud)’. Although Shia Sufism’s origins begin after the 
Arab Muslims conquest of Iran, which led to the end of the Sassanian 
Empire in 651 AC and later to the decline of Zoroastrian religion, ‘they are 
not often thought to occupy an historical locus, i.e. one restricted by 
temporal and spatial dimensions’ (Van den Bos 2002, 31).  
Ali Shariati and Corbin were Massignon’s1 research assistants, his 
student and successor respectively. Both had attempted to redeem 
‘authenticity’, but Shariati’s idea of ‘baz gasht be khishtan’ (return to the self) 
remained a socio-political ideology, while Corbin’s idea of ‘return to origin’ 
is understood as a mysticism trying to stay away from petty politics 
(Shayegan 1990, 280 cited in Van den Bos 2005, 120). Later, Heidegger’s 
                                                          
1 Louis Massignon (1883-1962) was a scholar of Islamic mysticism and a professor at the 
Collège de France from 1925 onwards. He had also been a priest and a dedicated member 
of a small but international Catholic group of mystics.  
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intellectual influence on Corbin convinced the latter to bring Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics to Iran, together with his Western criticism, which in turn 
influenced spiritual perspectives of Shia thinkers who were in Corbin’s 
circle (ibid: 36). Shariati, who had studied in Paris and was influenced by 
French and German Marxists, also caught national attention and played a 
significant role in politicising and revolutionising Shi’ism in Iran at the time, 
especially by his writings such as ‘On the Sociology of Islam’ (see Shariati 
1979). Unexpectedly, Iranian Shi’ism became promptly politicised, and 
Khomeini’s rhetoric sped it up in the 1970s.  
Both Shariati and Corbin died before the 1979 Revolution, but there 
is still debate between their followers. For instance, Reza Davari Ardakani, 
one of the students of Corbin, who refers to Heidegger’s critics of the West 
in his philosophy, was engaged in a series of philosophical debates against 
Soroush (Van den Bos 2002, 43). Ardakani criticises contemporary 
modernity in the West and recognises the only redemptive path for Iranians 
as leaving the West as an integrated whole. In contrast, Soroush takes 
sympathetic approaches to the West, known as the Popperian approach, 
and tries to justify modernism by a philosophical analysis of religion 
(Roohani et al. 2014), particularly after settling down in the US. Kayhan-e 
Farhangi (Cultural Universe) magazine published a series of Soroush’s 
articles entitled ‘Qabd va Bast-e Ti’urik-e Shariat’ (The Theoretical 
Contraction and Expansion of Islamic Religion), which laid the foundation 
of Soroush’s epistemological approach to religious modernism 
(Jahanbakhsh 2001, 142). By welcoming modernity, Soroush criticised 
tradition, with ups and downs in his intellectual constellation. His 
philosophical discourses and debates during the first decade of the 1979 
Revolution do not show his enthusiasm to modernity, but in some cases 
present him as an adversary to modernity and technology. Soroush 
gradually shaped a combination of modernist, post-modernist and mystical 
ideas in the second and third decades of the Islamic revolution, particularly 
during the ‘reconstruction’ and ‘reform’ influenced by the post-modernist 
environment in the world (Roohani et al. 2014, 556). 
 
The problem with Corbin’s analysis of Shi’ism was his ignoring the 
revolutionary potential in the Shi’ite concept of martyrdom and its 
symbols, while the problem with Shariati’s analysis of Shi’ism was 
his inspiration by the political and revolutionary Shia, without 
considering its dangerous potential, which already was experienced 
during the French and the Russian revolutions. Now, the problem 
with Ardakani is his acceptance of a totalitarian system in Iran 
(Isaloo 2017).  
 
In contrast, the most considerable issue of Shoroush’s explanation of Islamic 
democracy is disregarding the scapegoat mechanism, sacrifice, memetic 
desire, and Shia symbols and images that political actors and the corrupted 
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religious leaders are able to utilise during the liminal periods, such as the 




Liminality During the 1979 Revolution 
 
During the 1979 Revolution the country was in a liminal period. In other 
words, the Iranian society was torn between two orders; an old order, which 
was abolished, and a new order that was not yet established (Isaloo 2017). 
As Fischer- Lichte (2005, 97) pointed out in his study of ‘the Soviet mass 
spectacles’, in revolutionary times  
 
society undergoes substantial changes and decisive 
transformations. A multitude of possibilities seem to emerge; 
contradictions can coexist in peace; anything might happen. 
 
Just as revolutionary actors, Khomeini used existing symbols and rhetorical 
techniques to mobilise a considerable crowd. He employed Shia cultural 
narratives, symbols and language to establish a collective Shia identity and 
to unify or mobilise the population as required. In fact, he used the potent 
symbols of Ta’ziyeh in Ashura and the narrative of ‘Hidden Imam’ to justify 
his authority and to charge the revolution. ‘Khomeini never claimed to be 
the twelfth imam’ (January 2008: 36), but by accepting the title of Imam, 
implicitly he did. In this way, he constructed and introduced political Shia 
Islam to society, by promising to solve the social problems, which he 
identified during the monarchy pre 1979. His performance and rhetoric 
resulted in changing the existing social order. The web of mosques and the 
network of merchants in Bazaar’s mosques and their financial support, 
particularly for the 1979 revolution (Keshavarzian 2007), helped Khomeini 
to use his religious position as Ayatollah to mobilise a tremendous and 
powerful crowd in Iran, a crowd that was not easy to control, opposite 
mobilising it, and a crowd that was destroying, breaking, firing, torturing, 
injuring and killing (Isaloo 2017). Any revolution is a time of liminality. 
Violence and disobedience, which was one of the undeniable characteristics 
of the Islamic revolution, could be seen everywhere in Iran, especially in 
large cities. In this liminal time, order was replaced with chaos and 
lawlessness: a fearful, a deadly and an exhilarating period.  
 Rationality had less to say and emotion was governing everyone. The 
evoking of emotion between people was fast, frenetic, and easily 
transferable to others. In other words, emotions were dividing, splitting, 
and changing similar to the cell division in a body. In Szakolczai’s (2013a) 
account, other factors played a part, such as a combination of will and 
emotion, which overshadowed rationality in achieving the successful 
response in this liminal situation. In liminal period any crowd and 
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movement only need a minimal number of people to feed the frenzy and 
then propel join the crowd to larger numbers. Similar to Canetti’s (1960) 
explanation of the crowds behaviour, everyone was joining the crowd, even 
if they did not know exactly what was their goal and purpose of joining, or 
indeed, what the target of the behaviour was. The memetic desire was 
visible everywhere. This was due to crowd characteristics, whereby an 
individual’s behaviour adapts to suit the crowd behaviour in which it is 
immersed. Due to this, the crowd was growing and after a short time, an 
endless crowd were on streets. Burning car tyres, firing and destroying 
cinemas and government buildings, shouting, shooting and breaking down 
anything related to the previous regime became a daily pleasurable activity 
for the crowds (Isaloo 2017). 
 During this liminality, everyone felt free to do anything, endless 
possibilities seemed available, so there were no limits to crowd behaviour. 
Dangerously, many individuals and groups took a more personal 
vengeance not only against the Shah and his supporters, but also against 
people who they simply did not like. Since many people believed that 
Khomeini has supernatural power and can perform a miracle, they believed 
and stated that Khomeini could stop all modern weapons and gun 
machines, such as the war tanks and fighter airplanes belonging to the 
enemy (especially America). In a literal sense, this demonstrated a carbon 
copy of Imam Hussein’s power in the Ta’ziyeh narrative. Shia in Iran 
believe that in the Karbala tragedy, Imam Hussein could use his Godly 
power to kill and destroy all of Yazid’s army, but he did not use it. Many 
people believed that Khomeini’s return would fulfil all of the Shia Muslims’ 
dreams, such as the dream of being free and equal under Islamic justice. 
Every day, crowds were marching on the streets or in public places carrying 
slogans and chanting revolutionary mottos such as ‘freedom’, ‘equality’, 
‘brotherhood’ and Islamic republic. Consequently, the crowds were ready 
to be used for revolutionary actors’ goals, targets, and their own political 
ends (see Isaloo 2017). Utilising Shia cultural narratives and Ta’ziyeh 
symbols gave excellent results for the revolutionary clerics. For example, 
the revolutionary clerics could hijack the revolution, which was a broad 
coalition, by calling other revolutionary political parties ‘Kufyan’ which 
refers to the people of Kufa (a city in Iraq) who sent letters to Imam Hussein 
in order to invite him to Kufa and give allegiance to him, but they did 
opposite to what they had written and abandoned Imam Hussein in the 
Tragedy of Karbala. This was the easiest way to  manipulate people and to 
justify killing, imprisoning and torturing their potential oppositions.   
 Now everything started to change, even personal outlooks. Men now 
wore long sleeves and grew their beards, and women were told to cover 
their hair and wear a hijab. Actually, everything reflecting the old regime, 
such as books, money and arts were demanded to be destroyed and 
forgotten. After the Shah’s departure and the failure of his nominated 
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government ‘Shapoor Bakhtiar’, the place of power was empty and the 
public sphere was filled with revolutionary standards and mottos. In this 
liminality, revolutionary leaders and actors, who were united in order to 
defeat the monarchy, were struggling to be the first to grab the power. 
Successively, Khomeini appointed Bazargan, who was Western educated, 
nationalist and deeply religious, to form a new government. Believing that 
the laws of Islam could coexist peacefully with the secular laws of the state, 
Bazargan attempted to propose two choices for people in order to get a 
referendum on the existence of ballot after the revolution: a religious 
government and a secular government. However, Khomeini rejected it and 
offered only one choice; ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a religious government, which 
resulted in ninety percent of the votes in favour of an Islamic republic on 
March 30, 1979 (see Takeyh 2009). Accordingly, Bazargan was confronted 
with the Revolutionary Council (a group of clerics backed by Khomeini) 
and ultimately clerics who prevailed in their quest to have a single Islamic 
government. In this way, Khomeini and his allies gained more power and 
confidence of the people that aided and prompted further action and 
operations.  
 After the referendum and grabbing the power, no one was safe and 
everyone could be targeted by others. Importantly, anyone criticising and 
questioning Khomeini and his followers (especially revolutionary clerics) 
could be marked as a ‘hypocrite’ or ‘infidel’ and consequently could be 
killed, tortured and put in prison. Thereafter, people were either killed or 
imprisoned for their past association with the old regime (Shah). Even 
people, who co-operated with each other and with Islamic group to ensure 
the revolution was a success, were punished because of their membership 
and activities in revolutionary groups such as the liberals, nationalists and 
other moderate forces. For instance, even members of the Mojahidin-e 
Khalq organisation (MEK or MKO), who played a significant role in the 
1979 revolutionary victory, who fought on the side of clerics against the 
Shah pre 1979 and against the other revolutionary groups after the 
revolution, were marked as ‘hypocrites’. Accordingly, all of their offices and 
houses were attacked and members were either killed or arrested (Isaloo 
2017).  
 Khomeini’s supporters prosecuted and imprisoned thousands of 
people (January 2008; Takeyh 2009), and on many occasions, without trial. 
Therefore, after the revolution, living conditions and choices became 
extremely limited and repressed, compared to that of Shah’s time. Although 
Khomeini claimed he is not a dictator and acts on God’s will and people’s 
behalf, an absolute totalitarian regime was created and developed under his 
despotic rule and his advanced theological concept velayat-e faqih 
(Guardianship of the Jurist or Providence of the Jurist) (Takeyh 2009). Even 
though George Orwell two famous Novels ‘Animal Farm’ and ‘1984’ were 
more related to the communism system established after the 1917 Russian 
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Revolution (Orwell 1976), but a very similar events happened in Iran after 
the 1979 Revolution. 
 
 
Prolonged Liminality After the 1979 Revolution 
 
Within the liminal period of the revolution, Khomeini and his allies 
interpreted any speech, comment and movement of their oppositions as a 
mark of disrespect towards Prophet, Imams and Islam. Therefore, the 
Muharram ceremony, especially Ashura and Ta’ziyeh performance, started 
to receive the full support of the new regime. Revolutionary clerics 
confidently utilised symbols, images and narratives of Ta’ziyeh to 
manipulate people. Not only could they professionally use them for 
mobilising crowds, but they also utilised them for calming down the crowd 
when the need arose (Isaloo 2017).  
 People who were protesting aggressively against the Shah, with 
revolutionary slogans and mottos, calling for freedom, equality and 
brotherhood could not get any requests fulfilled. In fact, they have been 
forcibly silenced for decades. Minority religious groups have been 
oppressed and repressive measures have ruled every day for the majority 
of the population. Subsequently, the liminal period of the revolution 
produced new liminalities such as economic crisis and political insanities, 
which evolved and developed into a permanent and prolonged liminality. 
Mass murder, killing, terror, torture and imprisonment never stopped and 
is still continuing. For example, the chain murders of dissidents and 
intellectuals from 1988 to 1998 (Sahimi 2011). Some conservative clerics, 
such as Sadegh Khalkhali, believed ‘unsuitable individuals should be 
liquidated or killed so that others can live free’ (January 2008: 49). In fact, 
they used phrases out of the Quran, such as ‘Mofsed-e fil’arz’ (corrupt on 
earth) or Mahareb (enemy of Islam), to justify their decision to convict people 
under the auspices of capital crime.  
 Sometimes unexpected events, incidents, accidents, circumstances 
and occurrences in liminal periods help revolutionary actors transform into 
supernatural figures or powerful magicians. These provide perfect 
instances for these actors to manoeuvre and manipulate symbols and 
meanings. For example, the failure of the ‘Operation Eagle Claw’, the 
United States Armed Forces operation to free American hostages in Iran on 
24 April, 1980, was explained as a miraculous successful event in Iran, in 
order to strengthen Khomeini and his allies’ positions. They claimed that 
their God and their prayers destroyed the American Delta force with sand 
clouds. Indeed, some of Khomeini’s followers related it to the godly and 
supernatural power of Khomeini (see Fox News 2008). In this way, the 
figure of Khomeini, who was already identified with Imam, became a pure 
and sacred force of good struggling against the evil and satanic forces.  
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 The best and the most powerful way to encourage Shia in Iran to 
participate in a movement, a revolution or war is by employing and 
embedding Ta’ziyeh thematic into real time, and by utilising its symbols 
that it clearly illustrates the struggle of good versus evil, albeit 
manipulatively. Any symbol has meaning and its meaning lies in the belly 
of the symbol itself. Although meanings of symbols can be interpreted 
differently in various liminal times, depending on their objectives, but 
symbols stay the same. For example, the Ta’ziyeh symbols employed 
during the revolution to identify the Shah as ‘Yazid’ and the United States 
of America as ‘Great Satan’, get different meaning when they are displayed 
or used in a merchant stores or business places. In business realm and 
market places, the Ta’ziyeh symbols can be used for goodwill or for 
justifying trades. However, these symbols are used to manipulate 
customers in marked place as well, especially during the liminal periods, 
such as the economic crisis, revolution and war. Thus, since the 1979 
Revolution religion and its symbols are used by the regime as a tool to 
manipulate the pubic. 
After the revolution, a range of political groups, from the far left to 
the far right, from secular to ultra-Islamic, were vying for political power, 
but at the end the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), led by Khomeini and his 
allies, took the power over and established a tyrannical regime based on 
Sharia rules. Gradually, particularly after the decease of Khomeini, a 
process of conflict started and two politico-religious groups became 
significantly powerful and influential in Iran. The first group was following 
the concepts and writings of the highly influential ultra-hardline cleric 
Mesbah Yazdi (Mohammad-Taqi). His philosophy was embedded in 
velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Jurist). His fundamental and extreme 
Islamic ideology is advocating the balance of power being held by an 
Islamic leader who is called velayat-e faqih, such as Khamenei presently. 
Therefore, Mesbah Yazdi, in his website, requests Iranian to obey any 
decision made by velayat-e faqih. Not only does Yazdi have his own ambition 
to succeed Khamenei as supreme leader, but he also is vehemently against 
reformers seeking more democratic representation in Iran (Beaumont 2009). 
He has referred to theological and historical traits and archives to conclude 
that the secularisation and democratisation of Iran is against the religious 
order (Boroumand 2002). This decree is continually endorsed by the Islamic 
regime in Iran aiming to justify its Islamic rules. Ahmadinejad, who has 
been the President for two terms (2005-2013), was one of the well-known 
followers of Mesbah Yazdi and strived to practice his philosophy and 
ideology. In order to protect this position coupled with the aim of gaining 
people’s support, Ahmadinejad started to use Shia Imams’ names in his 
speeches, especially Imam Mahdi (the Twelfth Shia Imam). Notably, even 
before the end of presidency he claimed that he communicates with Imam 
Mahdi. Ultimately, this was a powerful armour to protect himself from both 
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legalists and reformers in Iran. This is a clear example of permanent and 
prolonged liminality, which enables the political actors to employ Shia and 
Ta’ziyeh symbols and images to form the public sphere. 
The second influential group that evolved after the 1979 Revolution 
were followers of the Islamic reformists and philosophers, such as 
Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar. They introduce Islamic 
pluralism, which challenges the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran (Khomeini) who claimed that Ayatollahs have a God-
given right to govern (MacLeod 2005). Notably in the last decade, their 
writings have attracted global attention about the compatibility of Islam 
with democracy, as they argue that people can be democrats whilst equally 
remaining faithful Muslims (ibid). Both the former president Khatami and 
the leader of the Green Movement, Hossein Mousavi, in Iran are influenced 
by reformist philosophies. In comparison, Soroush followed the 
philosophical arguments of other Islamic thinkers, such as Morteza 
Motahhari and Ali Shariati (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2008, 92). Soroush (2000) 
criticised the view of divine rights of political rulers and their absolute and 
unlimited power by employing one of the most commonly used terms for 
Islamic theology called Kalam. The Arabic word Kalam has several 
meanings, such as words, talk, statement, conversation, and remark, but 
this term in Islamic theology is linked to speech, debate, discussion and 
augment, which is called Ilm al-kalam (science of discourse) in Arabic and 
Elm-e Kalam in Persian speaking areas. Some Islamic thinkers, such as 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his followers called Hanbalis criticised the use of 
Kalam and considered the discipline as sinful.  
 
For them the creeds of Islam were manifestly established by the 
Quran and explained by the prophet, thus there was no need to 
prove the beliefs of a Muslim rationally (Saeed 2006, 60).  
 
Soroush claims that he uses Kalam to signal for a liberation of citizens and 
freedom for a collective society, in order to enable the performance of 
political agency, to aid the genuine cultivation of ethnical and religious 
believers, and for the seeker of justice (Soroush 2000 and Dallmayr 2011). 
People always yearn for freedom, economic growth, social justice and 
security. Political actors are aware of these desires and they usually use 
them as catchphrase to mobilise crowds or to blame the existing leaders for 
failing to produce these public goods, needs and wishes. Importantly, these 
slogans are well-known to Iranians, especially before and during the 1979 
Revolution, as Iranians were surrounded by this kind of magic rhetoric. 
Indeed, Soroush’s (2000; 2010) and Kadivar’s (2011) analyses of the ‘Islamic 
democracy’ confuse the reader, as it is unclear whether they criticise 
modern democracy or support it.  
Some authors such as Engineer (2006) aims to solve this puzzle by 
arguing, ‘Islam is not incompatible with secularism if it does not mean 
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rejection of religious faith’ (Engineer 2006, 344). Nevertheless, the puzzle 
remains unsolved due to two significant issues. First, unexpectedly, 
Soroush and Kadivar, who were active members of the 1979 Revolution and 
are still Shia thinkers, overlook the Shia culture and symbols which were an 
essential tool for political actors in Iran in last four decades. Second, 
Soroush never clarified properly the position of women, minority groups, 
and other religious political groups and parties, such as Zoroastrian, 
Christian, Jewish, and Baha’i, in his proposed Islamic democracy in 
‘Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam’ (2000). Indeed, Soroush’s 
proposal leads us to imagine a type of prolonged and/or permanent 
liminality. A system whereby the political actors and the corrupted 
religious leaders can use religious and cultural symbols, images and signs 
to form the public sphere and to manipulate the population for their pre-





During liminal periods, such as revolutions, experience of the past can be 
used in the form of rhetorical, religious and cultural symbols without the 
backing of truth, virtue, or justice. By forming the public sphere and 
manipulating large numbers of people, through utilising Shia symbols and 
images, the political actors and the corrupted religious leaders in Iran could 
mobilise a crowd to pursue their own interests and goals.  
In liminal situations, the political actors and the revolutionary clerics 
lead people, through mimesis, to sacrifice themselves consciously or 
unconsciously. This was particularly visible during the 1979 revolution 
when the revolutionary clerics employed Ta’ziyeh symbols, images, and 
signs to promote  sacrifice for their own self-interest. Indeed, the sacrificial 
and scapegoat mechanism was used to convince people that the Shah 
caused all problems and if they will be killed fighting against him, they are 
martyrs as Imam Hussein and his companions and they will go directly to 
paradise. 
To sum up the arguments of Turner, Dilthey and Girard, social or 
collective memory plays a vital role in forming the public sphere of a 
society. A memory has the power to affect our present experience and 
actions, and collective memory is able to produce both order and disorder, 
sustained and punctuated by the ritual performances in which this is 
evoked. Ritual performances remind us events that occurred in past, shape 
our present, and create a potential force for the future. Exploring Ta’ziyeh 
during the 1979 Revolution illustrates that symbols of this ritual 
performance and its commemoration has a potential power, which  can 
have the effect of locking a society in prolonged liminality. But, this does 
not mean that cultural and religious performances and their symbols, 
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images and signs cannot use for building a better society. We need to create 
a mechanism for preventing the political actors and the revolutionary 
religious leaders from employing  symbols, images and signs in liminal 
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